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Abstract:  In this paper, we investigate the implications of the philosophical considerations 
presented in Nozick‘s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by examining group formation in a laboratory 
setting where subjects engage in both cooperative and conflictual interactions.  We endow 
participants with a commodity used to generate earnings, plunder others, or protect against 
plunder.  In our primary treatment, we allow participants to form groups to pool their resources.  
We conduct a baseline comparison treatment that does not allow group formation.  We find that 
allowing subjects to organize themselves into groups does not lead to more cooperation and may 
in fact exacerbate tendencies towards conflict. 
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I. Introduction 
 We often engage in activity that is detrimental to those around us, finding ourselves in 
situations where the individual incentives facing us lead to suboptimal outcomes at the social 
level.  Indeed many, if not most, of these activities occur in a setting where no external 
enforcement is available to settle the conflicts that inevitably emerge.  One means of overcoming 
these social dilemmas is for individuals to unite as a group.  By forming alliances for a common 
purpose, groups may hope to encourage recalcitrant individuals to cease activity destructive to 
the social order.  Such tribal behavior is inextricably linked with our development as a species.  
Indeed when viewed through the critical lens of history, Rousseau‘s ―noble savage‖ is an 
artificial construct, for man has never existed as an island apart from his peers.   
There is much to be said of human achievement through the combined efforts of the 
group.  A quick read through Joel Mokyr‘s narrative history of human invention and creativity 
leaves one marveling at the wealth humans have created since classical antiquity (1990). The 
grandeur of these achievements is blemished, however, by the equally amazing propensity of 
man to wage wars and commit mass genocide.  As Matt Ridley succinctly summarizes, ―[w]e 
may be among the most collaborative social creatures on the planet, but we are also the most 
belligerent‖ (1997, p. 193).  It is this tension between cooperation and conflict within the context 
of group formation that we examine more closely in this paper.   
Using the laboratory method, we conduct a ―heuristic experiment‖1 to examine, as 
Hirshleifer (2001) puts it, the manner, form, and degree to which ―[c]ooperation, with a few 
obvious exceptions, occurs only in the shadow of conflict‖ (p. 11).  We draw largely upon the 
work of Nozick (1974) in developing an interactive framework in which subjects can pool 
resources as a group for the purposes of both predation and protection of endowments of an 
income-generating asset.  Following Nozick, we call these groups ―protective associations.‖  
Relative to the canonical laboratory experiment in economics, we impose a minimal structure on 
our participants to examine a variety of complex strategies that subjects develop to solve the 
problems they face.  Our goal is to observe what institutions, if any, arise endogenously out of a 
                                                 
1
 Smith (1982) explains that ―[h]euristic or exploratory experiments are used to provide empirical probes of new 
topics of inquiry….It is through exploratory probes of new phenomena that attention may be redirected, old belief 
systems may be reexamined, and new scientific questions may be asked‖ (p. 272-273). This is a fitting description of 
our motivation for this paper.  Using the laboratory method of inquiry, our aim is to develop new ways of 
understanding questions pertinent to political philosophy and constitutional economics. 
 2 
myriad of possibilities to produce a social order within a group of individuals seeking to attain 
their own subjective ends.   
A critic might ask how we could know whether protective associations historically 
developed this way.  Clearly, we do not know nor claim to be shedding light on this question.  
We have an example and technique to ask a question about how people build social orders.  
Wherever, however, or if ever protective associations originated in history, people, from the 
Aborigines in Australia to the Sámi people of Lapland, had to create a social system to cope with 
conflict.  The structure of this social order necessarily reflected the cultural legacies of the tribe 
and clearly depended upon the geographic, physical, and economic settings that they faced.   
Likewise, in our experiment, subjects must create their own social order within the novel context 
in which we place them.  To paraphrase Nozick, we learn much by seeing how social order could 
have arisen, even if it did not arise that way.
2
 
 
II. Protective Associations 
 Nozick articulates a theory of how social order could emerge from anarchy through the 
formation of protective associations.
3
  He suggests ―Groups of individuals may form mutual-
protection associations: all will answer the call of any member for defense or for the enforcement 
of his rights…Alliances are designed to allow partners to share risk and resources, gain 
knowledge, and obtain access to markets‖ (p. 12).  He poses several dilemmas that could 
mitigate the productive efforts of the association.  First, protective associations may need to deal 
with ―cantankerous or paranoid members‖ along with those who would use the power of the 
protective association to violate the rights of others.  Second, groups will need to resolve internal 
conflict between its own members to avoid ―each calling upon his fellow members to come to his 
aid‖.  Third, groups will need to make efficient use of the division of labor and exchange.  
Finally, groups must decide on what prices or services to provide for those who may desire more 
extensive or elaborate protection (p. 12-13). 
                                                 
2
 See Nozick‘s similar discussion on the relevance of state-of-nature theory in understanding social processes (p. 7-
9). 
3
 Protective associations can be translated into a large domain of groups historically.  Families, tribes, clans, 
cooperatives, corporations and political action committees all take on certain characteristics of protective 
associations.  For the purposes of this study, protective associations are defined as groups that form as a response to 
a dilemma where incentives lead individuals to act counter to the interests of the community as a whole.   
 3 
Nozick also recognizes the potential for conflict between protective associations.  He 
posits three potential resolutions to such conflicts.  First, members of a losing protective 
association may try to join the winning protective association.  Second, the protective 
associations may use geographic location to isolate themselves from other groups.  Third, rival 
protective associations may find themselves equally matched and will come to a tacit agreement 
not to fight or to resolve conflicts in a more peaceful manner.  Nozick argues that eventually, 
however, the largest protective association in a local area will subsume all other protective 
associations through force or contract.  This ―invisible-hand process,‖ by which spontaneous 
forces create one overarching group, emerges because the most efficient group is able to attract 
new members due to its superior benefits, and it will ―buy-in‖ outside members into its ranks in 
order to militate against further predation against its current members.
45
 
 Economists have utilized the notion of protective associations as a thought experiment to 
compare the merits of private and public law enforcement.
6
  As this literature is mostly 
peripheral to the purposes of this paper, we mention only a few related points.
7
  Rothbard (1973) 
and Friedman (1973) first argued that protective associations would bring about a more efficient 
enforcement of law, and would prevent conflicts with each other through contract.  Their 
argument is that protective associations have a monetary interest in stability and therefore the 
protracted costs of conflict outweigh the benefits of contracting with other associations to avoid 
this conflict.  This line of reasoning would suggest that a stable equilibrium should eventually 
emerge as the opportunity cost of conflict becomes too great. 
                                                 
4
 A previous referee of this paper remarked on the similarity between this argument and the Coasian depiction of the 
organizational genesis of the firm.  Just as firms ―buy-in‖ labor and capital inputs rather than go through the tempest 
of the market, so does the protective association internalize conflicting parties rather than allow such conflict to play 
out in an uncontrolled manner.    
5
 Though see Childs (1977) and Moss (1980) for a critical discussion of this process of ―buy-in‖ along with its 
concomitant free rider problem.  Their argument essentially questions the feasibility of buying in outside members 
as the ―marginal‖ inside member would rationally leave the group only to be subsidized to come back in.  In the 
limit, this leads to an unraveling of the protective association. 
6
 In a highly original piece, Becker and Stigler (1974) argue that bringing more law enforcement into the realm of 
the market instead of the public domain would provide enforcers with better incentives to accommodate their 
respective clients.  While this argument has been criticized (see Landes and Posner 1979; Cowen 1992; and Sutter 
1995), several arguments have been made in defense of protective associations as a viable alternative to the public 
provision of law enforcement (Friedman 1973, 1994; Caplan and Stringham 2001).  See Powell and Stringham 
(2009) for an in-depth description of this ongoing debate. 
7
 Research on protective associations relates more broadly to the literature examining how and to what extent self-
enforcing exchange can achieve social cooperation.  This includes research on private law enforcement (Friedman 
1973; Benson 1990; Stringham 2007), community and commercial dispute resolution (Ellickson 2005), international 
trade (Grief 1993; Leeson 2007a, 2007b, 2008), and property rights in the historical context of the American western 
frontier (Anderson and Hill 2004). 
 4 
 Cowen (1992) argues that the assertion of a stable equilibrium involving a multitude of 
protective associations ignores the underlying factors that will instead lead these associations 
inexorably to monopoly.  He maintains that protective associations would benefit from network 
externalities, which would cause a collapse from a multitude of protective associations into 
several or even one.  After this collapse, the inefficiencies associated with the group‘s 
monopolistic hold on protection will arise.  In response, Caplan and Stringham (2001) maintain 
that associations would have difficulty overcoming the obstacle of collusion that all oligopolies 
face.  They argue that the incentive to renege and offer services that are more competitive will 
overcome the incentive to collude. 
 Our focus on protective associations also relates to research on the economic analysis of 
conflict more generally.  These papers emphasize the stability of various forms of ―anarchy‖ 
given certain conditions (e.g. Skaperdas 1992; Hirshleifer 1995; and see Durham et. al. 1998, 
Carter and Anderton 1999, Duffy and Kim 2005, and Lacomba et. al. working paper for 
experimental applications of this research).  Drawing on these initial models, a few efforts have 
incorporated coalition formation into the analysis.  Skaperdas (1998) examines the formation of 
alliances within conflict.  He finds that coalitions will emerge if there are increasing returns to 
pooling resources used for appropriation.  Noh (2002) introduces the problem of distribution and 
collective action within the alliance.  He still finds that alliances are feasible given certain 
assumptions regarding these intra-group costs and the returns to pooling resources.  Esteban and 
Sakovics (2003) find, however, that the conditions necessary for a ―grand coalition‖ to emerge 
are more stringent than the previous literature indicates.  Within the parameters of their model, 
they find that the costs of intra-group conflict will outweigh the benefits of inter-group 
cooperation.   
 Finally, our paper contributes to research that examines the philosophical arguments of 
Nozick and Rawls from an economic perspective.  For example, Mezzetti (1987) argues that 
Nozick‘s procedural-based rights arguments ignore consequences, and apparently, are 
inconsistent with Rawlsian distributive justice, which emphasizes that when inequalities exist, 
society should arrange them to benefit the least-advantaged members of society.  Mezzetti 
shows, however, that under conditions of perfect competition, the Nozickian argument for rights 
is the most effective means for achieving Rawls‘ minimax principle.  Therefore, he concludes 
that Paretian efficiency, Rawlsian distributive justice, and Nozick‘s procedural rights must no 
 5 
longer be inconsistent with one another.  Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) model allocation rules 
in the context of solidarity and the collective sharing of a resource, incorporating and addressing 
Nozick‘s idea of guaranteeing an individual a minimum benefit from his skills. Bavetta and 
Peragine (2006) consider Nozick‘s emphasis on the expressive benefit of a chooser making 
choices in their development of axioms on autonomy freedom. This research both identifies 
implicit logical and empirical assumptions in Nozick and brings Nozickian philosophical 
concerns to the construction and evaluation of social choice mechanisms.  
 
III. Experimental Design and Procedures 
A. Environment and Institutional Parameters 
 We draw upon the design and procedures in Powell and Wilson (2008) in building our 
own experimental design.  We endow six subjects with a number of units of a commodity x that 
earns $0.00077 for every second that it is designated as an earnings unit e.
8
  Prior to receiving 
this endowment, each subject takes a short quiz that includes questions drawn from SAT exams.  
We utilize the quiz to induce subjects with a sense of entitlement towards their endowments.  
Previous experimental work indicates that this procedure does indeed generate a sense of an 
earned property right (see e.g. Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982, 1985; Hoffman et al., 1994; and 
Cherry et al., 2002). The endowments of x are: 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, and 29 with the subject scoring 
highest on a quiz receiving the endowment of 29, second highest 27, and so forth.  Ties are 
broken by giving the higher allocation of units to the person who finished the quiz first.   
 Subjects can convert these initial endowments of x into units of either offense o, defense 
d, or hold as e once the experiment begins. Recall that holding one unit in e generates $0.00077 
per second.  If, for example, a subject with the average endowment of units (24 units) were to 
hold her earnings in e for the entire session (assuming no units are taken), then she would earn a 
payout of $44.35.
9
  
                                                 
8
 We recognize the limitations, particularly in the variations of group membership, of having only six subjects.  We 
conducted pilot sessions not reported in the study with twelve subjects and found the environment was too involved 
for subjects to coordinate their decisions well.  Furthermore, conflict was rampant.  By reducing the number of 
subjects, we enable Nozick‘s original conception of group formation greater opportunity to manifest itself within our 
laboratory context.  We strongly encourage further work on expanding the experimental environment to incorporate 
larger numbers of subjects.   
9
 This is calculated as follows: Maximum Median Earnings = 24 units 40 minutes  60 seconds  0.00077 $/sec  = 
$44.35. 
 6 
Subjects may use offensive units to take units of x from another subject, and use 
defensive units to protect the subject‘s existing units of x.  Units placed in defense and offense do 
not earn money and cannot be taken.  Conceptually this is reasonable as tools used for predation 
and protection (firearms, security systems, walls, etc.) are not easily stolen and do not usually 
generate income for their owners.
10
  The opportunity cost of having offensive and/or defensive 
units is the productive value of holding units as e.
11
  Following Powell and Wilson, we 
incorporate a 10-second transaction cost of converting units of e into either o or d, during which 
time the unit does not earn money.  Subjects may convert as many units as are available to them 
in one transaction. 
 Subjects can use the units of offense to take e from another subject.  The probability that 
an attempt to plunder is successful is determined by the number of offensive units (oa) attacker a 
has compared to the number of defensive units (dt ) the target t under attack has.  Specifically, the 
success rate for the attacker is 
ta
a
do
o

.  After any attempt to take earnings units from other 
subjects, offensive units are not available for use for 20 seconds.  This additional transaction cost 
simulates the recovery costs of using force. 
 Individual subject holdings of e, o, and d are publicly observable to all participants 
throughout the experiment.  We notify subjects of all attempts at taking and the result of the 
attempts.  Individual subject identities remain anonymous at all times. 
 In what we will call the Nozick treatment, subjects are also able to form subgroups with 
other subjects.  A subject starts a group by selecting a button ―Start Group‖ and then sending 
invitations to other subjects to join.  These invitations come in the form of a prompt on the 
invited subject‘s screen.  The invited subject can either accept or reject the invitation.  A subject 
cannot join—or even be invited—if she or he is currently a member of another group.12  Only the 
founding member of the group can extend invitations.  Finally, no member can be removed from 
a group once she or he joins, though any subset of the group can always leave to form another 
group. We designed the treatment to prevent subjects from ejecting members from their group 
for two reasons. First, though numerous decision rules for how this can be performed are 
                                                 
10
 Such investments may be categorized as the rent-seeking costs of theft (see Tullock 1967). 
11
 See Hirshleifer (1995) for a theoretical discussion of this tradeoff between productive and predative resource use. 
12
 Note though that this rule only applies to formal invitation.  Informal invitation to leave one group and join 
another may occur through the public chat room.  This was a regular occurrence in the sessions. 
 7 
possible, such as majority, plurality, unanimity minus the offending subject, etc., each of these 
methods require adding an additional complication to an already complex treatment, and further 
each rule would lead to its own set of prejudices and logistical difficulties.  Since there is no 
clear theoretical or historical support for how this mechanism should be designed, we simply 
allow members to leave groups from which they no longer wish to participate rather than impose 
some cumbersome and arbitrary rule.  In addition, it is relatively easy for members of a group to 
eject a ―rogue‖ member by all members simply leaving the group and forming a new one without 
the rogue member.  For example, the total number of mouse clicks required for two people to 
leave a group and form a new one is five.  Though this still entails some cost and therefore could 
reduce the effectiveness of ostracism as a strategy for maintaining order within the group, the 
actual results of the sessions do not suggest this was problematic.  
 Groups have the added ability to pool their respective defensive and offensive 
capabilities.  Let G= {1, 2,…, 6} denote the set of all individuals and Gi denote the ith 
(nonempty) subset of person(s) formed by a partition of G.
13
  Once a group is formed, members 
of the group automatically share all units of defense, i.e., the number of defensive units for each 
person in Gi is 
 iGj
jd .  For example, if a person with oa units of offense attacks a target t 
currently part of a group, the probability of success for the attack against t is 



iGj
ja
a
do
o
 as 
opposed to merely
ta
a
do
o

. 
 In contrast to the defensive units, which we automatically pool, group members also have 
the option of pooling offensive units on a voluntary basis.  To pool units of offense, subjects 
click on a button above the group member they wish to lend their offensive units.  The lender 
must send all or none of their units of offense to the designated group member.  While the lender 
loans these units out, she or he has no ability to take units from any other subject.  The reason is 
that the person who the lender offers the units to is effectively using the units for that lender.  At 
any moment, the lender can instantly regain control of their units of offense by clicking the 
button above the designated group member a second time.  Let oiG denote the subset subjects that 
                                                 
13
 A subset of the subjects (and therefore a group) can consist of only one subject.  In fact, this is what occurs when 
a group has formed but no other subject has yet accepted an invitation to join it. 
 8 
have lent a subject their o.  Subjects who borrow o are able to use these units as if they were their 
own, meaning the probability of success for attack against target t now becomes
t
Gj
a
Gj
a
do
o
o
i
o
i




.  In 
addition to this change in probability, subjects who borrow o are also able to take more than one 
e in any given attempt.  The reason for this is that they are effectively using the units of the 
lender in the attack.  Therefore, any successful attack counts as a successful attack for each 
participating member and takes one unit for every member that contributes to the pool of 
offensive units, conditional that the target has that many units to take.  If the target does not have 
that many units, then the successful attack will remove all available units of the target.  For 
instance, if three subjects each lend another subject their units, then this subject will now take 
four units with each successful attack rather than one.  If a subject attempts to plunder another 
subject within their own group, however, then neither subject commands the pooled resources d 
or o of the group.  It is as if they are attacking outside of the apparatus of the group.  Though this 
would seem that membership within the group is equivalent to participation in the Hobbesian 
jungle, we found that intra-group conflict was prevalent in only one session (see the discussion 
section below).
14
  
 We also allow subjects to send e to other subjects.  They may perform this by entering the 
desired amount of e and the intended subject of these units into a text box and then clicking send.  
If subjects voluntarily send units using this mechanism, then they permanently reside with the 
recipient (at least until the recipient is plundered or voluntarily sends units out themselves). 
Subjects are able to communicate using both a public and a private chat room.  All 
subjects in the experiment can read messages sent to the public chat room, which is visible to all 
subjects throughout the experiment.  Groups have the additional ability to communicate through 
a private chat room that is only visible to subjects within the particular group.  We allow this 
private communication to allow groups to more easily facilitate cooperation within a mostly 
conflictual environment.  Previous experimental research shows that communication can indeed 
increase the likelihood of cooperation (see Ostrom et. al. 1992).  The subject is able to observe 
successful and unsuccessful takes by her and others.  We display the amount of time passed in 
the session, earnings per second, and total earnings and update every second.  In addition, the 
                                                 
14
 See Nozick‘s discussion of the need to reduce intra-agency private enforcement of rights (p. 15). 
 9 
subject can see how many defensive units and offensive units that her group controls at all times. 
Figure 1 displays a sample screen shot for this treatment.    
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot for Nozick Treatment 
 
B. Baseline Treatment  
 As a baseline to the Nozick treatment, we also conducted a treatment that did not allow 
subjects to form groups, which we label the Hobbes treatment.  Subjects in this treatment are not 
able to form groups and thus do not have any of the additional abilities that go along with group 
formation, including the ability to lend offensive units, pool defensive units, or communicate 
through a private chat room.   
  
C. Procedures 
 We conducted six sessions in each of the two treatments, for which we recruited 72 
subjects from the at-large undergraduate population at George Mason University.  We seated 
subjects at a visually isolated computer terminal where they interacted anonymously with other 
participants.  Sessions lasted 40 minutes after approximately 15 minutes of instructions.  We 
 10 
recruited subjects for an experiment that could last up to 90 minutes, but we left the actual 
experimental interaction time undisclosed to mitigate end-game effects of a necessarily finite 
experiment.  Subjects received instructions about how to participate in the experiment (see 
Appendix 1) followed by a quiz of 10 questions.  Each session had six participants who only 
participated in a single session of this experiment.  Subjects received $7 for showing up on time 
in addition to what they earned in the experiment.  The average earnings without the show-up 
payment were $14.50.  We paid out earnings privately at the conclusion of the experiment. 
 
IV.  Examining Anarchy 
In building a design to examine the environment depicted in Nozick, we utilize a more 
open-ended framework that allows subjects to use multiple strategies in repeated interactions 
among one another.  Though we lose the strict control of a more game theoretic orientation, we 
find that challenging subjects to simultaneously overcome free rider difficulties, 
miscommunication, and the incentive to defect from socially optimal strategies better 
approximates the difficulties individuals face in environments bereft of external enforcement.  
We find the impulse to place strict parameters on environments depicted as anarchic 
inconsonant.  Such methodology surely serves the theorist more than the theory.  In contrast, our 
approach incorporates the greatest difficulties raised in the literature that individuals face when 
forming groups to better utilize scarce and contestable resources while at the same time 
providing individuals with certain basic means in overcoming the social dilemma in which we 
place them.  This enables us to observe institutions that subjects create themselves rather than the 
execution of institutions that we impose.   
While the variety of strategies in a dynamically repeated game precludes the computation 
of a narrow set of Nash equilibrium strategies ex ante, we postulate several conjectures related to 
several observable outcomes.  First, we hypothesize that the Nozick treatment will be more 
efficient on average than the Hobbes treatment.  We determine efficiency by the ratio of units 
placed into e relative to the total number of units available.  Following the terminology in 
Skaperdas (1992), we define ―full cooperation‖ as occurring when all available units in the 
economy are placed in e.  More formally, efficiency at time t is defined as 




6
1
6
1
k
k
k
k
x
e
E

 , where 
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

6
1k
kx is always 144.
15
  The ―average efficiency‖ in a session (of 2400 periods) is 
2400
2400
1


E
.  Nozick‘s 
claim that protective associations lead to a social order serves as the foundation for this 
hypothesis.   
Of course, every experimental ―test‖ of a theory is a joint test of the theory and the 
applied context in which the theory is implemented (Smith 2002, 2008).  If we observe that our 
economies in this first laboratory experiment regularly deviate from Nozick‘s philosophical 
argument, then only with more observations under a wider variety of environmental and 
institutional conditions will it become possible to deduce with more confidence whether these 
systematic deviations are due to an auxiliary hypothesis on how an experiment is implemented, 
or due to the circumstance that the foundations of Nozick‘s argument do not comport with the 
facts of human sociality. 
Second, we hypothesize that a single group will emerge in the Nozick treatment that will 
eventually include all active members.  According to Nozick, a monopoly on force can emerge in 
the market for protection without the help of artificial entry barriers, as this market is both 
relative and violent.  In other words, the value of a protective association is determined 
according to its relative abilities compared with competing associations.  Furthermore, this 
competition is violent, so joining the association with an absolute advantage in violence is 
pertinent for the rational consumer.  Simply stated, ―customers will not stably settle for the lesser 
good and competing companies are caught in a declining spiral.‖ (p. 17)  Nozick conjectures that 
as one group becomes relatively more powerful than its rivals, its members will either terminate 
the remaining individuals
16
 or find it beneficial to provide protective services to the unaffiliated 
members to reduce the risk of conflict.   
Third, we hypothesize that the ability to communicate in real time allows subjects to 
coordinate better on cooperative strategies and settle their conflicts, resulting in higher efficiency 
in our Hobbes treatment relative to the observations in Powell and Wilson.  As mentioned above, 
Ostrom and Walker (1992) find that allowing subjects to communicate can lead to a pronounced 
change in rates of cooperation.  The other difference between our Hobbes treatment and Powell 
and Wilson is that we allow subjects to transfer units voluntarily.  We incorporated this feature 
                                                 
15
 A total of 1 unit in each of two Nozick sessions was lost in the ether when a subject transferred multiple units.  As 
0.7% of the total number of units, we do not find this to be a consequential software glitch. 
16
 Following Powell and Wilson (2008), we define ―termination‖ as occurring when a subject has 3 or less units of x. 
 12 
into our baseline treatment primarily to further limit the differences between treatments to focus 
our comparative analysis.  We also added this feature in recognition of Buchanan‘s argument 
that ―[t]o secure an initial agreement on positive claims to goods or to resource endowments, 
some transfer of goods or endowments may be required.  That is to say, some ‗redistribution‘ of 
goods or endowments may have to take place before a sufficiently acceptable base for property 
claims can be established‖ (Buchanan 1975, p. 83).  Though it would seem that the addition of 
these two features reduces the comparability to Powell and Wilson, we do find the results of our 
Hobbes treatment closely approximate theirs with a few exceptions noted below.   
 
V. Anarchy, State, or Utopia? 
 In reporting our results, we first formally test our hypotheses regarding Nozick and 
Hobbes treatments.  To convey a deeper level of the rich interactions in these societies, we next 
summarize our twelve Nozick and Hobbes sessions using evidence from chat transcripts, along 
with general observations about each session.  Each session description also includes a chart that 
displays the allocation of units between the three uses at each second of the session.  The charts 
for the Nozick sessions contain a line plot of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration 
for each moment of the session.
17
  This quantifies the extent to which a single protective 
association emerges in the session. Finally, we offer qualitative remarks to organize the general 
patterns that we observe. 
 
A. Testing Our Hypotheses 
Efficiency 
 In assessing our hypotheses, we find several surprising results.  In terms of efficiency, the 
Nozick sessions displayed uniformly low levels of cooperation with only one session (N6) 
achieving efficiency greater than 50%.  The Hobbes sessions on the other hand were either 
highly efficient (H1, H2) or dismally inefficient (H3, H4, H5, and H6).  Table 1 reports the 
efficiency levels of the six Nozick sessions along with the Hobbes sessions.
18
  Using a 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average 
                                                 
17
  We calculate the HHI as the sum of squares of the percentage share of units under the control of each group at 
any moment of time.  Subjects who were not part of a group were counted as a group of one.  Thus, the HHI at the 
start of each session contains six shares. 
18
 The relative comparison between Nozick and Hobbes does not change significantly when average efficiency of the 
sessions is broken down into halves or thirds. 
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efficiency of the Nozick and Hobbes sessions are equally efficient (W6,6 = 20, p-value = 0.5909, 
one-sided test). 
  Table 1. Average Efficiency 
Session Nozick Hobbes 
1 22.7% 60.6% 
2 34.4% 88.2% 
3 17.6% 11.6% 
4 26.7% 14.7% 
5 13.3% 13.7% 
6 51.4% 21.8% 
Average 27.7% 35.1% 
 
The two Nozick sessions in which full cooperation arose (N2 and N6) led to moderate 
levels of efficiency but the remaining four were low.  Subjects in both sessions H1 and H2 were 
able to attain full cooperation very early in their respective sessions. Because the life of a 
laboratory economy is necessarily finite, unlike the naturally occurring world in which time 
marches on, a frequently raised question is whether the subjects just need more time to ―learn,‖ 
so they can conform to the outcome predicted by our hypothesis concerning the higher 
efficiencies of the Nozickian societies.  If so, why did sessions N2 and N6 not need more time to 
reach 100% efficiency?  And why did sessions H1 and H2 need such little time?  Apparently, our 
experiment is sufficiently long enough to generate a variety of outcomes, which is exactly what 
we need to help us to understand what factors account for better or worse performance in these 
economies.   
 
Group Formation 
 In terms of group formation, the Nozick sessions were marked both by cooperative and 
conflictual tendencies.  Contra the invisible hand process proposed by Nozick, we do not observe 
an inevitable tendency for the subjects to form a single group.  This was most strikingly evident 
in session N3.  Not only did the single group break back down into several subgroups, but also 
there was no change in the amount of plundering before or after the overarching group formed.  
Moreover, Sessions N2 and N4 developed a relatively stable equilibrium of two distinct groups 
for most of their respective sessions.   
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Our Hobbes Treatment vs. Powell and Wilson’s 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we find no evidence that the ability to communicate in real 
time allows our subjects to coordinate better and settle their conflicts relative to the similar, but 
communication-free exercise in Powell and Wilson (2008).  Comparing our 6 sessions with their 
8 sessions, one of our sessions is the most efficient at 88.2%, and another is the most inefficient 
at 11.6%.  Not surprisingly then, we fail to reject using a Wilcoxon test the null hypothesis that 
the average efficiency of the two experiments are equally efficient (W8,6 = 31.5, p-value = 
0.8375, one-sided test).  Succinctly put, communication is not a sufficient solution to this 
particular problem. 
 
B. Summary of Nozick Sessions 
Session N1 
 Very few groups formed in N1.  There were numerous attempts to start groups by a few 
of the subjects but almost all of these invitations were rejected.  The group formation that 
occurred was sporadic and short-lived, and no group formed until after the experiment was past 
the two-thirds mark.   
 The average efficiency was also very low in this session (22.7%) due to constant 
plundering, and two subjects were terminated.  An interesting development occurred towards the 
end of the session with at least three of the active subjects proposing a truce.  One subject said, 
―hey guys listen i got a way to increase our earnings.  lets all place our units in earn and let it 
increase per sec.  no one attack each other.‖  Two of the other subjects seemed receptive to this, 
but the session ended shortly after these comments.  It was not apparent at that time that they had 
reached an agreement. 
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Session N2 
 Two groups emerged almost immediately in this session.  Both groups pooled their 
offensive capabilities, and in each group, one of the subjects took the lead in offering advice on 
how to utilize this feature of the experimental interface.  About one-third of the way into the 
session, two groups had emerged with three members each.   
 One group focused, though not exclusively, on increasing their units of defense and held 
the rest of their assets in earnings, while the other group put nearly all of their units into either 
offense or defense at any one time.  Eventually, one subject had the idea of a truce by stating in 
the group‘s private chat room, ―everyone SHOULD just stop attacking and earn.‖  This led the 
group to further decrease their offensive units but resulted in no parallel behavior by the other 
group.  Later the same subject wrote a message in the public chat room that said, ―there needs to 
be an agreement between everyone.  see no one is making money right now.‖  A subject from the 
other group then responded in the public chat room, ―should we all agree not to attack.‖   
 The two subjects who had communicated a truce in the public chat room then went back 
into their respective group chat rooms and prompted their group members to put all units into 
earnings.  One of the subjects asked for a signal of trust from the other group by asking them to 
―take your units out of offense so i can trust you.‖  There was still some hesitation as each 
subject began to pool more and more units into earnings.  One of the groups even suggested a 
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trigger strategy in case the other group defected.  However, all subjects eventually put all units in 
earnings and abided by the agreement. 
 
 
Session N3 
 Group membership in this session was erratic with members accepting invitations but 
then leaving the group soon after.  As a result, groups were not very stable.  It appeared that 
subjects did not develop a sufficient level of trust within groups as there was very little offensive 
pooling.  At the same time, the number of attacks was quite large, and the average efficiency 
suffered as a result (17.6%).  There was no indication of any interest of a truce.  No clear leaders 
emerged among the subjects to instigate such an outcome or even to coordinate attacks.  One 
person was terminated.   
 It is interesting that the majority of the chatting took place in the public chat room versus 
private group chat rooms.  An especially interesting development occurred when all six subjects 
were part of the same group just over halfway through the session.  Yet this led to no observable 
decrease in plundering!  The group eventually dissolved.  There was no attempt at cooperation at 
this time or any other in this session. 
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Session N4 
 Two groups formed about a third of the way through this session.  These two groups 
contained two members each until about halfway through the session.  At this time, both groups 
invited one of the remaining two members.  The two groups did not coordinate their attacks in 
any systematic way.  Pooling occurred occasionally but was sporadic, as the groups never came 
to an agreement on who would attack and how they would distribute the plundered units.  
Attacking was mostly uniform across the session though efficiency did improve towards the end 
of the experiment.   
 Efficiency was relatively low in this session (26.7%), and one person was terminated.  By 
the end of the session, four of the five active subjects were in one group, which may have been 
why efficiency started to rise towards the end of the session.  There were no explicit attempts to 
cooperate, however. 
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Session N5 
 This session had a similar pattern of group development to Session N4.  For about half of 
the session there were two groups with two members each.  There were no explicit attempts to 
pool offensive resources within the groups.  Eventually, one of the groups acquired another 
member and finally a fifth member.  The remaining sixth subject never joined the group.  By the 
end of the session, this remaining subject was attempting to plunder but was unable to get 
through the defenses of the five combined subjects.  The large group pooled more of their units 
into earnings as the session reached its conclusion.  However, overall efficiency was quite low 
(13.3%) due to the earlier plundering.  Like the two previous sessions, there was no attempt to 
communicate a truce among the subjects. 
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Session N6 
 This session started like much of the others with two groups forming.  One of the groups 
was especially well coordinated and quickly pooled their offensive capabilities.  This led to a 
significant amount of plundering from the other group.  Halfway through the session, a ―leader‖ 
in this group proposed a truce by inviting the others to join their group.  This led two of the 
remaining three members to join what one subject termed their ―alliance.‖  Eventually, the 
remaining subject joined as well.   
 From the halfway mark on, efficiency steadily climbed.  By the end of the session, all 
available units were in earnings.  Note that this session and Session N2 are the only Nozick 
sessions where full cooperation emerged.   
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C. Summary of Hobbes Sessions  
Session H1 
 The first posted message in this session was ―no one is earning money.‖  Shortly 
thereafter, another subject proposed an agreement to stop predation by offering, ―how about we 
all put ours in earn and not take from each other so at least we earn something,‖ which the 
subjects discussed and agreed to.  At one point during this discussion, a subject tried 
unsuccessfully to take from another subject, but this was the last attempt at predation in the 
session.  The subjects agreed not to take from each other with one subject offering, ―and if 
someone gets greedy everyone else will just steal from them.‖  The subjects reached full 
cooperation shortly after the halfway mark in this session. 
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Session H2 
Predation was largely absent in this session relative to the others.  In fact, only 23 
attempts to plunder occurred in this session.  This is due perhaps to one subject‘s proposal for an 
agreement to stop conflict very early in this session.  The same subject also proposed the strategy 
of taking units away from anyone who continued to hold units in offense.  The proposal did not 
work, however, and the subjects continued to attack each other.  Several began to recognize, 
however, that they could do better if they all refrained.  For example, one subject said, ―we can 
allmake a lotmore if you stop [attacking].‖   
After testing several parameters of the experimental environment, several subjects 
attempted to persuade others to invest fully in earnings.  One subject was concerned that the 
subject who organized the agreement was making more than everyone else, saying, ―this was 
your idea i want to know how much you are making‖ because ―it wouldnt be fair if you have 
more then everybody.‖  The ―leader‖ of the effort to cooperate replied, ―i'm making .0216.‖  At 
this point a third subject came to the defense of the leader by saying that ―if he is [making more 
money] its becuase he got more questions right,‖ in reference to the way initial earnings were 
allocated.  They continued to discuss the fairness of the distribution of earnings and whether 
subjects should return units they had previously taken .   
Full efficiency was reached less than a third of the way through the session.  This 
efficiency was interrupted only once during the remainder of the session when one subject broke 
the agreement by successfully taking from another subject.  The plundered subject immediately 
responded by taking a unit back.  There were no more takings for the remainder of the session. 
The subjects in this session were very concerned about distributive issues.  There were 
several proposals for ways to improve the distribution, but some noted the difficulty in 
determining who owed compensation to whom, because everyone had stolen from everyone.  
One subject suggested that everyone should have an equal amount.  Another subject told 
everyone to ―give back whatever you stole.‖  The subjects agreed to this last strategy and began 
transferring units to compensate for previous takings for the remainder of the session.   
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Session H3 
The most notable feature of this session was the lack of chat.  The first message did not 
appear until the second half of the session, when one subject asked, ―Subject 2 can you send 
some units to 6.‖  Following this request, subjects posted several similar messages prompting 
subjects to redistribute units voluntarily.  For example, one subject told another to ―give some to 
Subject 4 dont be greed…he or she needs it.‖  Towards the end of the session, a subject proposed 
that they all ―put everythng in earnings.‖  Nevertheless, plunder continued until the end of the 
session.  Efficiency was persistently low and never went past the 50% mark once the session 
began. 
 
Session H4 
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After several minutes, the participants began chatting, and one subject was terminated 
early.  One subject proposed, ―want to make a pact whereever ones puts there stuff in earnings 
and doesnt take from anyone and just collect mmoney?‖  There was some discussion about a 
possible agreement, and several subjects said they would comply.  However, one subject held out 
and did not respond even when directly addressed by the other subjects.  The subject rarely 
engaged in conversation.  When he did, it was unclear what he meant.  For example, he 
interjected ―game over‖ in the midst of a discussion regarding cooperating.  Perhaps the holdout 
thought that if all subjects begin to cooperate, the experimenter would end the session arbitrarily 
or perhaps that refraining from dialogue would increase his bargaining power (See, for instance, 
Schelling 1960).   
After the halfway mark, the subjects discussed making an agreement without the holdout.  
They come close to agreeing on a contract, but it is unclear if they ever really made one.  For 
instance, one subject complained that they could not make money if the holdout continued to 
take from them.  In the remainder of the experiment, the subjects pleaded with the holdout, who 
remained silent.  This session was particularly interesting because all subjects clearly desired 
agreement except for one, yet this one subject‘s refusal to commit to an agreement was an 
effective obstacle to implementing it. 
 
Session H5 
Communication began early in this session, as a subject proposed cooperation by asking, 
―What would happen if we all just put everything in earnings.‖  Later another subject explicitly 
proposed a cooperative agreement by asking, ―does everyone want to try setting a defense for all 
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of us and depositing all our offense in earning and not attacking.‖  The others did not agree and 
continued to take from each other.  The initial instigator for cooperation raised the idea again 
saying, ―I vote we put it 100% in earnings‖ and ―Can we agree on dumping all our points into 
earnings?‖  Four of the subjects agreed but attempts at plundering continued throughout the 
session.  One of the two subjects who did not agree to the cooperative agreement did not send 
any messages during the entire session.   
 
Session H6 
 The subjects did not communicate in this session until after the halfway mark.  Soon after 
they did, they began to discuss a cooperative agreement.  The establishment of such an 
agreement never took place, however, and the session was particularly nasty, brutish and short. 
Three subjects were terminated.  Two of these subjects were ―resurrected‖ later in the session by 
transferred units from one of the remaining subjects, for which he received the praise, ―bravo 
person 5.‖ 
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Discussion 
 In interpreting our results, we draw upon Miller (1992), who addresses social dilemmas 
within the context of hierarchy.  The similarity between Miller‘s work and our own is the 
common attempt to address issues of conflict within an environment where incentives may lead 
individuals to act against the interests of the collective unit.  Miller posits three general features 
that may solve coordination failures in the context of a social dilemma: leadership, the creation 
of cooperative social norms, and binding institutional provisions to maintain cooperation (p. 233). 
These general insights are helpful in determining why some sessions led to such dismal 
levels of efficiency while others were able to achieve full cooperation.  Each session that 
achieved full cooperation had particular subjects who constantly appealed to their fellow subjects 
to cease plundering.  Most of the sessions that did not reach full cooperation had no such 
leadership in guiding the group to the cooperative outcome.  In session N1, for example, Subject 
3 emerged as a leader in focusing the group on a more cooperative outcome.  Unfortunately, his 
comments came at the end of the session and the group did not act on them in time to increase 
overall efficiency.  In session N2, Subject 6 was the most vocal in coaxing both members of his 
own group and the other group to cease attacking and to put all of their units into earnings and 
was eventually successful in this endeavor.  Subject 1 in session N6 impelled his fellow subjects 
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to cease attacking, and hence the session was able to reach full cooperation more quickly than 
any other Nozick session.  The result was that this was the most efficient session in the treatment. 
 Sessions N3, N4, and N5 were notable for their lack of leadership to achieve cooperation.  
There was no message that mentioned either the nature of the dilemma that the subjects faced or 
what actions would be necessary to attain full cooperation.  This result is especially surprising 
when we take the Hobbes sessions into account.  All six Hobbes sessions had at least one subject 
mention the dilemma and the cooperative strategy of putting all units into earnings.  Only half of 
the Nozick sessions, however, explicitly expressed this mind-set.  This leads us to the conjecture 
that the group formation mechanism in our experimental environment obfuscates the social 
problem to be solved by activating the evolutionarily deep ―us-versus-them‖ mentality of tribes.   
 In another paper with free-form communication among its participants, Kimbrough, 
Smith, and Wilson (2008) investigate how impersonal distal exchange may grow out of local 
personal exchange in an economy with three geographically separated communities each 
connected to a local meeting area.  To quantify how personal or impersonal their participants‘ 
exchanges are, they conduct a word count on the first-person plural pronoun ―we‖ in the local 
and distal chat rooms.  They argue that the word ―we‖ reveals a personal connection between its 
user to another person or persons, and indeed find overwhelmingly that subjects use ―we‖ more 
often in the local personal community.   
In conducting a word count on our own transcripts, we find two results of interest.  
Because our participants all reside in the same visible area, ―we‖ and ―us‖ in the Nozick 
treatment could be inclusive of the small subgroup or the whole group of six participants in a 
way that the context of the discussion could not discriminate.  However, the third personal plural 
pronouns ―they‖ and ―them‖ connote ―others‖ or rival outsiders.  These outsiders can be easily 
demarcated by color and private conversation in the Nozick treatment but not so in the Hobbes 
treatment.  To test the conjecture that the Nozick treatment actuates an ―us-versus-them‖ mindset 
in a way that the Hobbes treatment does not, we count the number of times ―they‖ and ―them‖ 
appear in the transcripts as well as how many times ―we‖ and ―us‖ appear.  We conjecture that 
―they‖ and ―them‖ will appear more often in the transcripts of the Nozick treatment than in the 
Hobbes treatment, but that there would be no difference in the use of ―we‖ and ―us.‖  Table 2 
reports the raw counts of these words.  
 
 27 
Table 2. Word Counts by Session 
Session We/Us They/Them 
N1 2 1 
N2 40 16 
N3 7 1 
N4 17 21 
N5 18 5 
N6 74 17 
Average 26.3 10.2 
 
H1 13 4 
H2 39 4 
H3 1 0 
H4 26 2 
H5 12 1 
H6 3 0 
Average 15.7 1.8 
 
As conjectured, we find that the subjects use ―they‖ and ―them‖ statistically more often in the 
Nozick treatment than in the Hobbes treatment (U6,6  = 29, p-value = 0.0465, one-sided test), and 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal usage of ―we‖ and ―us‖ across treatments (U6,6  = 
23, p-value = 0.4848, two-sided test).  This analysis of the chat transcripts is also revealing in 
that Nozick sessions where group formation was either erratic (as is the case with session N3) or 
absent altogether (such as in session N1) more closely mirrored in terms of word count their 
Hobbesian counterparts than their fellow Nozick sessions.  Of course, sessions where groups 
were operating effectively still failed to resolve the overall dilemma of efficient production by all 
subjects.  Thus, there is no indication that full cooperation follows from group stability. 
 Miller‘s third feature, binding institutions, has less relevance within the parameters of our 
experiment, as subjects were unable to commit to any sort of binding agreement given the lack of 
external enforcement.  However, in several sessions, subjects communicated ―rules‖ that would 
govern subsequent behavior once full cooperation had been achieved.  For example, in session 
H2 a subject was reluctant in putting all of their units into earnings so they retained some units in 
defense.  This led another subject, who was the leader in focusing the subjects on the cooperative 
outcome, to proclaim ―person 1, please take down your defense‖ followed by another subject to 
remark ―you dont wanna be against everyone else.‖  The offending subject eventually acquiesced 
and put all of their units into earnings.  In this case and in other sessions, it was apparent that the 
explicit threat of punishment created a provision militating against conflict.  This was easier to 
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accomplish once subjects placed the vast majority of units in earnings.  To illustrate the 
significance of this point, neither session that achieved higher than 90% efficiency after the first 
100 periods never subsequently fell below this mark. 
This use of non-binding institutions as a means to generate cooperation was most evident 
in how subjects responded to conflict within the group.  As discussed earlier, members of a 
group only have access to the group‘s defense resources when being attacked by subjects outside 
of their group.  Two reasons motivate this feature.  First, the principal goal of our project is to 
observe what institutions endogenously develop within the treatment.  An automatic defense 
mechanism against intra-group conflict could inhibit the discovery of the institutions needed to 
foster stable group formation by simply imposing these institutions exogenously upon the 
subjects.  To assume that intra-group conflict is somehow automatically solved through the 
pooling of assets is to assume away an important part of the very problem Nozick (and by 
extension we) are most interested in.  Second, while we recognize that our particular choice of 
design feature may or may not diverge from past conceptualizations by Nozick and others, it 
ultimately did not lead to regularly observed breakdowns in coalitional cohesion, as measured by 
the number of times a group member attacked a fellow group member in each session.  As the 
table below indicates, the number of intra-group attacks is essentially zero in all but one session 
(session N3). 
Table 3. Attacks Between and Within Groups 
Session Total Inter Intra 
N1 292 292 0 
N2 88 87 1 
N3 310 124 186 
N4 307 307 0 
N5 246 241 4 
N6 160 156 4 
 
Comparative analysis of the sessions where intra-group conflict was and was not 
problematic provides some interesting results on endogenous group governance. In the majority 
of cases where intra-group conflict occurred outside of session N3, we discovered explicit 
messages addressing the incident itself and in some cases responses detailing how to resolve the 
conflict. For example, the lone intra-group attack in session N2, where Subject 3 attacked 
Subject 4, occurred along with the following chat within the group: 
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Session N2 
 Time (sec) Subject Message/Action 
770 4 ok i finally got into the group 
776 6 everyone transfer offensive control to me 
777 3 Subject 3 successfully attacks Subject 4 
789 6 dude hes in our group 
790 6 Lol 
797 3 oh woops 
803 4 thanks man 
 
As the chat indicates, the attack may have been accidental.  Regardless, just acknowledging the 
incident appears to have been sufficient in preventing any re-occurrence or retaliation as the 
attack was not repeated and no counter-attack or punishment was apparently needed to sustain 
harmony within the group.    
 A similar incident occurred in session N6 when Subject 1 attacked Subject 5: 
Session N6 
 Time (sec) Subject Message/Action 
488 1 Subject 1 successfully attacks Subject 5 
504 5 why taking from me 
507 1 lol shit sry 
510 1 take back from me if u want 
533 5 Subject 5 unsuccessfully attacks Subject 1 
 
In this case, the intra-group attack was resolved when the aggressor offered retribution through 
counter-attack.  What is also interesting about this particular case is that even though the 
―victim‖ was unsuccessful in acquiring his good back, he did not try to attack again.  This 
communication through the private chat room again may have been sufficient in curtailing future 
attacks as no further attacks occurred. 
  In most cases, calling attention to an attack in the chat room appears to prevent further 
attacks from occurring.  For example, in session N6, two attacks occurred within a minute of 
each other.  In each case, the ―leader‖ of the group (Subject 1) reprimanded the attacker by 
asking all in-group attacks to cease: ―STop fighting each other if your in the group‖ and 56 
seconds later, ―no attacking‖. There were no further attacks after this second proclamation. 
 The analysis of communication in these sessions provides a useful counterpoint to the 
chat observed in session N3.  This session was quite volatile with group formation erratic and 
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extremely fluid.  Consider how the first intra-group attacks occurred.  Within 90 seconds of 
Subject 5 joining a group established by Subject 6, Subject 6 returns the favor by promptly 
attacking Subject 5.  Subject 5 soon left to form her own group and subsequently attacked 
Subject 4.  This action is telling as Subject 4 was the first to join Subject 5‘s group and in this 
case was attacked by the group‘s founder, Subject 5, shortly after joining (less than 40 seconds).  
Thus, the action parallels the context of the first attack between Subject 6 and 5.  Returning to 
the narrative of the first group established by Subject 6, the second subject to join this group was 
Subject 1.  Again within a short timeframe after Subject 1 joins the group (within 75 seconds), 
Subject 6 attacks Subject 1.  This is after Subject 1 had attacked Subject 3, another member of 
the group.  The intra-group attacks soon escalate with Subject 6 being particularly aggressive.  
We believe it is telling that Subject 6, the founder of what would go on to become the ―dominant 
protective association‖ in the session and include all six subjects, set such a conflictual precedent 
by attacking these joining members of the group within two minutes of their accepting the 
invitation to join.  Why these attacks occur is unclear as no dialog accompanies their actions.  
But it seems clear that the subjects in N3 are not treating the group as a sacred coalition to 
mitigate conflict, but as the means to draw people closer to be plundered.  Chat in general was 
quite sparse in N3 and accordingly nothing in the way of a proclamation against intra-group 
conflict took place.  This lack of discussion may have established the precedent that intra-group 
attacks are no worse than inter-group attacks, that is, that the sanctity of the group was not to be 
respected.   
 To summarize these findings, we observe that subjects were for the most part successful 
in discovering their own means of dealing with disharmony within the group, whether it be by 
communicating the fact that an attack within the group has taken place, using moral suasion to 
call out such an action, or even simply leaving the group with a ―rogue‖ member.  We find that 
these devices are important in establishing stability within groups by noting their absence when 
in-fighting is prevalent such as in session N3.  Though as stated above, it is curious that the 
sessions where group stability was fostered through cooperative informal institutions did not 
transfer this cooperation to the social level by solving the overall dilemma.  The paradox we 
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discover is that the same institutions needed to foster cooperation within the group may indeed 
alter the inclusive perspective needed to foster cooperation outside of the group.
19
 
 
VI. The Conflict of Groups 
 Contrary to the Nozick hypothesis, we find that allowing subjects to form groups does 
not ameliorate conflict.  If anything, it hinders the development of a collective regard for solving 
the dilemma by encouraging in- and out-group attitudes.  The implication of these observations 
is that the ability to form private protective associations does not alone foster the necessary 
social cohesion to blunt plunder and eliminate costly expenditures on the defense against 
plunder.  Sociality appears to be the key for a group to recognize the dilemma, and the 
emergence of a leader from within the group serves the vital role of encouraging participants to 
establish their own rules of order.
20
  As Hume (1740) appositely notes, ―It is only a general sense 
of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and 
which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules‖ (pp. 314-5).   
 It is deeply embedded in human nature for individuals to form tribal groups, yet such 
social formations may lead to both cooperation and conflict (Ridley 1997).  To ameliorate the 
threat of conflict, it may be prudent to move individuals beyond factions by focusing attention on 
the consequences of conflict and the rewards of cooperation.  Our experiments demonstrates that 
such endeavors appear to succeed where a general sense of common interest, leadership, and 
provisions against backslide are present.   
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 This outcome ties in closely to findings in psychology regarding inter-group competition.  Tajfel and Turner 
(1979) discuss a variety of experimental results indicating that only a minimal level of group awareness is necessary 
to elicit in-group bias.  As they note, ―the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups—that is, social 
categorization per se—is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group.  In other words, the 
mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory 
responses on the part of the in-group.‖ (p. 38)  They further show that conflict need not emerge from actual conflicts 
of interest, only the recognition of separable group identities.  This underlines our conclusion that the very presence 
of groups serves to exacerbate the dilemma we impose.  We thank an anonymous referee for directing us to Tajfel‘s 
findings. 
20
 This observation relates to the discussion in Williamson (2009) regarding the importance of informal constraints 
as juxtaposed to formal rules in tempering conflict.  Echoing the earlier work of Vincent Ostrom (see for example 
Ostrom 1997), Williamson demonstrates how formal rules are largely ineffective when not imbedded within pre-
existing informal constraints against conflict. 
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Appendix:   Experiment Instructions 
Welcome 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making.  Your earnings, which will be paid 
to you in CASH at the end of the experiment, will be determined partly by your decisions and 
partly by the decisions of others.  If you have questions at any time while reading the 
instructions, please raise your hand and a lab monitor will assist you.  
 
Each person is endowed with units of a fictitious good.  The number of units of this fictitious 
good you will start this experiment with will be determined by your answers to a set of 10 
questions.  You will then be ranked depending on how many questions you answered correctly.  
Ties will be decided by giving a higher ranking to the person who finishes the quiz in the shortest 
amount of time.  The higher your ranking, the more units you will start with. 
 
Your initial endowment will be placed in your earnings.  The number of units designated for 
earning is displayed in green under ―Earn.‖ in your box (the one labeled ―YOU‖).  You will earn 
$0.00077 per second for EACH unit you designate for this purpose.   This is equivalent to 
$0.0462 per minute per unit. 
 
Earnings units can also be used to take Earnings units from other people, which we will call 
Offensive units (―Off.‖).  Alternatively, Earnings units can serve as units for defense (―Def.‖).  
To move units to either Offense or Defense, click  or   buttons in your box (you will not 
be able to do this until the experiment starts).  It will take 10 seconds for the units to transfer.  
You may also transfer units back to Earnings in the same manner. 
Notice that the other players in the game have a (take) button next to their box.  If you 
have designated some number of units for offense, then you can attempt to take a unit from 
another player.  If you take a unit from someone else, it will be added to your Earnings units and 
taken away from their Earnings units.  Once you attempt to take a unit, you will not be able to 
attempt again for a period of 20 seconds.  Also, when you attempt to take a unit, a line will 
appear between your house and your targets.  The line will slowly fade as time passes.  Note that 
there are several other colored lines that will indicate certain functions throughout the 
experiment.  A key for these can be found in the top right- and left-hand corners of the screen. 
 
An attempt to take units from another person will be successful depending on how many units 
the taker has designated for Offense relative to how many units the target has designated for 
Defense. 
 
Specifically, the probability that the taker is successful is: 
Success rate of taker = (Units of Offense) ÷ (Units of Offense + Units of Defense) 
 
For example, if you have 1 unit of Offense and the target has 1 unit of Defense, the probability 
that the attempt will be successful is 1 ÷ (1 + 1) or 50%. 
If the target has 2 units of Defense, then the probability that the attempt will be successful is 1 ÷ 
(1 + 2) or 33%.   
If the target has no units of Defense, then the attempt will be successful 100% of the time.   
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You may communicate with others in the chat frame once the experiment starts.  To send 
messages, type in the small box next to the send button and press the enter key or the send 
button.  Your text will appear in the textbox above.  You are free to discuss all aspects of the 
experiment, with the following exceptions: you may not reveal your name, discuss side 
payments, make threats, or engage in inappropriate language (including such shorthand as 
‗WTF‘).  If you do, you will be excused and you will forfeit your earnings.  
 
[Begin Nozick treatment only instructions] 
Individuals can pool together units in a group.  To start a group, use the Start Group button at the 
bottom right corner of your screen.  The background color of your box will change to denote 
your group.  To invite people to join your group, use the  (invite) button next to their box.   
 
Everyone in your group will pool their defense.  This means that if there are 3 people in your 
group and each person has 5 units put towards defense, each person in your group will have a 
defense of 15. 
 
Everyone in your group will also have the option to pool offense.  To pool your offense with 
another person click the  (transfer control) button above their box.  This will transfer 
control of the units you have designated for offense to that person.  That means that if you have 5 
units for offense and the person you have transferred control to has 6 units then the combined 
offense will be 11 and that person may then attempt to take from another person.  If they are 
successful the person you have transferred control will receive one unit for each person 
(including themselves) that has transferred control to them.  You may retract your offensive units 
at anytime by clicking transfer control button again. 
 
You may chat with anyone in your group using the ―Group chat‖ frame at the bottom of your 
screen.  Only people currently in your group will be able to view and send messages in it. 
[End Nozick treatment only instructions] 
 
A summary of your earnings along with your current rate of earnings per second and the time 
elapsed in the experiment can be found in the ―Summary‖ frame at the bottom right corner of 
your screen.   
 
The sum of your earnings will be paid to you privately at the end of the experiment.  You will 
not be told how long the experiment will last.   
 
This is the end of the instructions.  If you have any questions please raise your hand and a 
monitor will come by to answer them.  If you are finished with the instructions please press Start. 
The instructions will remain on your screen until the experiment starts. 
 
A summary of the information is displayed at the bottom of your screen. You will not be told 
how long the experiment will last.  This is the end of the instructions.  If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer them.  The experiment will begin 
when everyone has finished reading the instructions. 
